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Abstract
If decision-makers (DMs) do not always do what is in their best interest, what do
choices reveal about welfare? This paper shows how observed choices can reveal whether
the DM is acting in her own best interest. We study a framework that relaxes rationality
in a way that is common across a variety of seemingly disconnected positive behavioral
models and admits the standard rational choice model as a special case. We model
a behavioral DM (boundedly rational) who, in contrast to a standard DM (rational),
does not fully internalize all the consequences of her own actions on herself. We provide
an axiomatic characterization of choice correspondences consistent with behavioral and
standard DMs, propose a choice experiment to infer the divergence between choice and
welfare, state an existence result for incomplete preferences and show that the choices
of behavioral DMs are, typically, sub-optimal.
JEL: D03, D60, I30.
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Standard normative economics employs the revealed preference approach to extract wel-
fare measures from choice data alone. The preferences revealed from the individuals choices
are assumed to be identical to the normative preferences representing the individuals best
interest. There is, however, considerable empirical evidence that in an array of di¤erent sit-
uations, individuals do not appear to act in their own best interest, establishing a potential
wedge between normative and revealed preferences.1
How should welfare analysis be performed if choices do not always reveal decision-
makers(DMs) best interest? One approach, advocated in an inuential contribution by
Bernheim and Rangel (2009),2 is to construct a welfare criterion that never overrules choice:
x is (strictly) unambiguously chosen over y if y is never chosen when x is available. While
this approach can exploit the coherent aspects of choice in a variety of behavioral models,
they are silent about situations in which DMs impose an externality on themselves, acting
against their own best interest. That is, x may be unambiguously chosen over y, but still be
against DMs best interest. This is particularly relevant for models of addiction, projection
bias, aspirations failure or overcondence.
In light of the above, we propose a di¤erent approach. We focus on identifying the
choice structure of a framework that relaxes rationality in a way that is common across a
wide variety of seemingly disconnected positive behavioral models and admits the standard
rational choice model. We show that choice data is consistent with rational choice if and
only if they satisfy Arrows (1959) axiom of choice. Choice data that satisfy Cherno¤ s
(1954) axiom of choice (also Sens (1971) axiom ) is compatible with the behavior of a
DM who is not internalizing all the consequences of her choices on herself. In the latter
case, preferences revealed from choices may not be an appropriate foundation for making
welfare assessments. Choices may be coherent in Bernheim and Rangels (2009) sense, but
1Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) point out that in the "heat of the moment," people often take actions that
they would not have intended to take and that they soon come to regret (Loewenstein, 1996). Koszegi and
Rabin (2008) and Beshears et. al. (2008) review empirical evidence of systematic mistakes people make.
Bernheim and Rangel (2007) record situations in which it is clear that people act against themselves: an
anorexics refusal to eat; people save less than what they would like; people fail to take advantage of low
interest loans available through life insurance policies; they unsuccessfully attempt to quit smoking; they
maintain substantial balances on high-interest credit cards; etc.
2See also Rubinstein and Salant (2008).
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may not represent the true preferences of the individual.3
In our decision model, a DM makes decisions that a¤ect her psychological states (e.g.
a reference point) which, in turn, impacts on her ranking over available alternatives in the
rst place. These psychological states can be interpreted as any pay-o¤ relevant preference
parameters that are a¤ected by own choices such us reference points, beliefs, emotions,
aspirations, temptations, moods, etc. The DM may fully internalize the e¤ect of her choices
on her psychological states, or she may not. If she does fully internalize the feedback from
actions to psychological states, she chooses an action and, as a consequence, a psychological
state, that maximizes her underlying preferences: this is labelled as a Standard Decision
Problem (SDP). If she does not internalize the feedback from actions to psychological states,
she chooses an action taking as given her psychological state at the moment she decides,
although psychological states and actions are required to be mutually consistent: this is
labelled as a Behavioral Decision Problem (BDP).
For example, consider a DM who chooses a bundle consisting of both material status
and health status, who is fully aware of the risk to her health from a single minded pursuit
of material status and who has revealed her preferences for health by, for example, paying
for costly treatments. In an SDP the DM will internalize the possible trade-o¤ between her
material status and health status when choosing her material status while in a BDP, the
DM will take her health status as given and strive to achieve the highest possible material
status without internalizing how her choice a¤ects her health. We motivate and illustrate
the distinction between an SDP and BDP by means of examples on addiction, loss aversion
and dynamic inconsistency.
We relate a BDP to the steady-state preferences of an adaptive preference mechanism
where agents understand the short-term consequences of their actions but fail to predict
the more delayed consequences. We relate an SDP to the steady state preferences of an
adaptive preference mechanism where agents internalize all the dynamic consequences of
their actions. Using this interpretation, we argue that our general framework unies seem-
ingly disconnected models in the literature, from more recent positive behavioral economics
models to older models. We also provide a new equilibrium existence result in pure actions
3Section 5, Remark 3 elaborates on this point.
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without complete and/or transitive preferences. A result like that this is important, since
incomplete and non-transitive preferences are a common token in behavioral economics
models.
Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization, via choice correspondences, of both a
BDP and SDP, and study the link between choice and welfare. We show that observed
choices are compatible with a BDP if and only if the choice data satisfy Cherno¤s axiom
(also Sens axiom ): the choice correspondence is (weakly) increasing as the choice set
shrinks when all alternatives chosen in the larger set are also present in the smaller set. This
testable condition, which violates independence of irrelevant alternatives, is weaker than
the condition (Arrows axiom) that characterizes an SDP, i.e. the choice correspondence is
exactly the same as the choice set shrinks when all alternatives chosen in the larger set are
also present in the smaller set. We then propose a choice experiment where, on the basis of
choice data alone, it is possible to infer the divergence between choice and welfare. Notably,
it is possible to infer whether a DM could be better-o¤ by choosing an available alternative
that she has never chosen.
We, then, derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which BDP and SDP
outcomes are indistinguishable from each other and show, in smooth settings, that the two
decision problems are, generically distinguishable and discuss the normative implications
of distinguishable decision problems. We briey discuss some policy implications of our
analysis and relate them to the libertarian paternalism approach (Thaler and Sustein, 2003).
We highlight the value of interventions such as psychotherapy that directly a¤ect the way
individuals internalize the feedback e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the framework of
decision-making by looking at examples of addiction, reference-dependent choice and dy-
namic inconsistency. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis and interpretation of the decision
model and contains the existence result. Section 4 characterizes, on the basis of choice cor-
respondences, Behavioral and Standard DMs. Section 5 focuses on distinguishability and
Section 6 contains a brief policy discussion. Section 7 relates the analysis reported here
to the related literature. The last section concludes and discusses directions for further
research. The details of the existence proof are contained in the appendix.
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1 Some Examples
Example 1: Micro 101
Consider a consumer choice problem where the decision maker chooses a commodity
bundle (x; y) to maximize a standard utility function subject to a budget constraint. Assume
preferences are increasing in both x and y and represented by a utility function u(x; y). The
Micro 101 analysis of decision-making in such a setting formulates the maximization problem
as one where a xed preference relation is maximized subject to a budget constraint, i.e.
maxfx;ygu(x; y) s:t: pxx+ pyy  w; x; y  0:
where px > 0 and py > 0 are the prices of x and y respectively and w is the wealth of the
individual. A di¤erent (but equivalent) formulation would be to assume that the DM only
chooses x; but internalizes that the amount of y consumed will go down if the amount of
x consumed is increased via the budget constraint rewritten as y = (x) = wpy  
px
py
x. This
second formulation corresponds to a Standard Decision Problem (SDP). The function (:)
is an example of a feedback e¤ect from the action chosen by the DM (in this case x) to a
psychological state (in this case y). In contrast in a Behavioral Decision Problem (BDP) the
DM, mistakenly, takes y as given when choosing x; although a decision outcome is required
to be in some sense stable, i.e. the amount of y that the individual actually gets to consume
for any choice of x must be feasible determined by the budget constraint.
An outcome of a BDP in this example is any non-negative commodity bundle x; y on
the budget line i.e. x+ py = w. Clearly, the individual, except in exceptional cases, cannot
be utility maximizing at all these commodity bundles and therefore, most outcomes of a
BDP will be welfare dominated.
Although this example is somewhat articial, it is a special case of general framework
where an individual chooses an action a to maximize preferences that, in turn, depend on
some psychological state p which is itself a¤ected by the chosen action via a feedback e¤ect
(:). Examples of p include beliefs, moods, self-condence, reference points, expectations,
temptations, etc.
In what follows, we present three more examples illustrating the distinction between
a BDP and an SDP. Intuitively, the key distinction between an SDP and a BDP can be
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stated as follows: in contrast to a standard DM, a behavioral DM compares actions using the
psychological state associated with their chosen action instead of varying the psychological
state (via the feedback function ) as they consider alternative actions. As such, a BDP
captures the psychological propensity to undertake actions without fully internalizing their
full (equivalently, long run) consequences.
Example 2: Addiction
Consider an agent who is considering whether to drink alcohol. The psychological state
will either be sober (if he does not drink) or inebriated (if he does). The payo¤ table below
provides a quick summary of the decision problem:
inebriated sober
alcohol 1  2 1 + 0
no alcohol 0  2 0 + 0
In this example, the payo¤s are an additive function of the action-based payo¤ and the
psychological state-based payo¤. Alcohol generates utility of 1; no alcohol generates utility
of 0. Sobriety generates utility of 0; inebriation generates utility of  2.
An agent who solves an SDP recognizes that he has to choose between the on-diagonal
elements. Alcohol goes together with the psychological state of inebriation. No alcohol
goes together with the psychological state of sobriety. Hence, the o¤-diagonal paths are not
options.
However, the behavioral agent mistakenly believes that (or at least acts as if) he can
change his alcohol consumption without changing his psychological state. Consequently,
the behavioral agent decides to consume alcohol (since alcohol is always better, conditional
on a xed psychological state). Consequently, the BDP chooses to drink alcohol and ends
up inebriated (with net payo¤  1). This is a mistake in the sense that the agent would be
better o¤ if he chose to drink no alcohol and ended up sober (with net payo¤ 0).
Example 3: Reference Points with Loss Aversion
Consider an agent who is considering whether to switch to a di¤erent service provider
(e.g., gas and electricity) from her current one. The psychological state (in this case the
reference point) will either be her current supplier (if she sticks with the current supplier) or
the alternative supplier (if she makes the change). There are two payo¤ relevant dimensions
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of choice with outcome denoted by x1 and x2 and preferences u(x) = x1 + v(x1   r1) +
x2 + v(x2   r2) where v(:) is a Kahneman-Tversky value function with v(z) = z if z  0;
v(z) = z;  > 2:5 if z < 0 and v(0) = 0. The cost of switching is equal to 0:5. The
status-quo option is dened by q = (0; 1) and the alternative option is a = (2; 0). The
payo¤ table below provides a quick summary of the decision problem:
status quo alternative
current supplier 1 2  2
alternative supplier 3:5   1:5
In this example, again, the payo¤s are an additive function of the action-based payo¤
and the psychological state-based payo¤.
An agent who solves an SDP recognizes that she has to choose between the on diagonal
elements. Sticking with the current supplier goes with the reference point status quo.
Choosing the alternative supplier goes together with the reference point of the alternative.
Hence, the o¤-diagonal paths are not options and the outcome of an SDP will be to switch
to the alternative supplier.
However, the behavioral agent mistakenly believes that (or at least acts as if) she can
choose between the two suppliers without changing her psychological state. Consequently,
there are two payo¤ ranked outcomes: one where the behavioral agent sticks with the
current supplier and the reference point is status quo, and the other where the agent switches
suppliers and the reference point is the alternative. The former choice is a mistake in the
sense that the agent would be better o¤ if she chose to switch and ended up with the
alternative as the reference point.
Example 4: Dynamic Inconsistency
Consider a three period problem t = 0; 1; 2 where a decision-maker has preferences
dened over a single consumption good ct; t = 0; 1; 2. The decision maker is endowed with
a single unit of the consumption good at t = 0 but has no endowment of the consumption
good in either of the subsequent two periods. The agent obtains no utility from consumption
at t = 0 but obtains utility from consumption at t = 1; 2 with an instantaneous linear utility
function c. Assume that the DM quasi-hyperbolically discounts the future with 0 <  < 1
and  = 1.
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There are two assets: (i) an illiquid asset where one unit invested yields nothing at
t = 1 and R > 1 units of the consumption good at t = 2, (ii) a liquid asset where one unit
invested at t = 0 yields 1 unit of the consumption good if liquidated at t = 1 and nothing
at t = 2; or if not liquidated at t = 1 yields R0 > R units of the consumption good at t = 2.
We assume that  < 1R0 .
The DM at t = 0 will choose which asset to invest in in order to maximize  (c1 + c2).
At t = 1 the current self of the DM will maximize c1 + c2. To represent the above
decision-problem in our framework we proceed as follows. The psychological states of the
decision-maker at t = 0 will be p1 ="tempted to liquidate at t = 1", p2 ="not tempted to
liquidate at t = 1" (corresponding to not liquidate). Note that at t = 1, if L was chosen at
t = 0, the current self of the decision-maker will be tempted and liquidate if R0 < 1 i.e.
 < 1R0 . Clearly, the current self of the decision-maker cannot be tempted to liquidate if at
t = 0 the decision-maker has invested in the illiquid asset.
Therefore, the action "invest in the illiquid asset" goes with the psychological state
p2 ="not tempted to liquidate at t = 1" while the action "invest in the illiquid asset" goes
with the psychological state p1 ="tempted to liquidate at t = 1".
The DM at t = 0 has to decide whether to invest in the liquid or the illiquid asset. A
quick summary of the decision problem of the decision-maker at t = 0 is:
tempted not tempted
liquid 1 R0
illiquid R R
In an SDP, the decision-maker will correctly anticipate that the asset chosen today will
a¤ect her psychological state at t = 1 and will choose to invest in the illiquid asset and
obtain a payo¤ of R > 1. In an SDP the decision-maker exhibits self-control by using a pre-
commitment device the illiquid asset. In a BDP, the decision-maker will believe (or act as
if) the asset chosen today will not a¤ect her psychological state at t = 1. Interestingly, there
is no pure action solution to a BDP. If the psychological state is "tempted", she will choose
to invest in the illiquid, but if the psychological state is "not tempted" she will invest in
the liquid asset. There is, however, a random solution where the behavioral decision-maker
chooses to invest in the liquid asset with probability p = R
0 R
R0 1 : if a behavioral DM believes
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that the distribution over psychological states is
n
R0 R
R0 1 ;
R 1
R0 1
o
, she is indi¤erent between
investing in either the liquid or the illiquid asset and is willing to randomize between the
two actions. By computation, it is easily checked that the expected payo¤ from such a
random action is less than R; the payo¤ of a standard decision-maker.
Remarks:
The above examples highlight a number of key features of our framework.
First, our framework is general enough to incorporate a wide range of applications in
behavioral economics and, in addition, to encompass the standard rational model as a
special case (SDP).
Second, as highlighted in the examples, in a BDP the DM imposes an externality on
herself and the outcomes of a BDP can be welfare dominated.
The rest of the paper works out the implications of the latter point. We rst ask whether
it is possible with choice data alone to inform the planner about the type of decision problem
the DM is solving. Proposition 2 and 3 tell us that it is possible by observing very simple
conditions. Second, we ask whether it is possible with choice data alone to infer whether
the individual is choosing optimally or not. Proposition 4 tells us that in some situations,
this is possible too. Finally, we ask how likely it is that when the DM solves a BDP he
chooses a suboptimal action. Proposition 5 tells us that in smooth settings, the behavioral
DM typically chooses suboptimally.
2 The General Framework
2.1 The Model
A decision scenario D = (A;P; ) consists of a set A of actions, a set P of psychological
states and a map  : A ! P modelling the feedback e¤ect from actions to psychological
states. It is assumed that  (a) is non-empty for each a 2 A. A decision state is a pair of
an action and psychological state (a; p) where a 2 A and p 2 P .
Although a natural starting point is to assume that preferences over A are indexed by
p, following Harsanyi (1954) we assume intra-personal comparability of utility. We assume,
not only that the decision-maker is able to rank di¤erent elements in A for a given p but
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also that she is able to assess the subjective satisfaction she derives from an action when the
psychological state was p, compared to the subjective satisfaction she derives from another
action when the psychological state is p0; i.e. to assume that the individual is able to
rank elements in A  P . This formulation is critical in order to make meaningful welfare
comparisons.
The preferences of the decision-maker are denoted by , a binary relation ranking pairs
of decision states in (A P )  (A P ). The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2 is written as
(a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read as "(a; p) is weakly preferred to (equivalently, weakly
welfare dominates) (a0; p0) by the decision-maker".
A consistent state is a decision state (a; p) such that p = (a). Let

 = f(a; p) 2 (A P ) : p =  (a) for all a 2 Ag
be the set of consistent decision states.
The two decision problems studied here are:
1. A standard decision problem (SDP ) is one where the decision-maker chooses a pair
(a; p) within the set of consistent decision states. The outcomes of an SDP, denoted by S,
are
S =

(a; p) 2 
 : (a; p)   a0; p0 for all  a0; p0 2 
	 :
2. A behavioral decision problem (BDP ) is one where the decision maker takes as given
the psychological state p when choosing a. Dene a preference relation p over A as follows:
a p a0 , (a; p) 
 
a0; p

for p 2 P .
The outcomes of a BDP , denoted by B, are
B =

(a; p) 2 
 : a p a0 for all a0 2 A, p = (a)
	
:
In both an SDP and a BDP, a decision outcome must be a consistent decision state.
In an SDP the decision-maker internalizes that her psychological state is determined by
her action via the feedback e¤ect. In a BDP the decision-maker takes the psychological
state as given although the chosen action and the psychological state have to be mutually
consistent.
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2.2 A Dynamic Interpretation
Myopic vs. farsighted adjustments
We interpret the outcomes of an SDP and a BDP as corresponding to distinct steady-
states associated with an adaptive preference mechanism where the DMs preferences over
actions at any t; denoted by pt 1 , depend on her past psychological state pt 1. The state-
ment a pt 1 a0 means that the DM nds a at least as good as a0, given the psychological
state from the preceding period.
Let h(p) = fa 2 A : a p a0, a0 2 Ag. For ease of exposition, assume that h(p) is unique.
Fix a p0 2 P . Dene a sequence of short-run outcomes as at 2 h(pt 1) and pt = (at) for
t = 1; 2; :::. and assume that at each step the DM chooses a myopic best-response. Dene
now a long-run outcome as a pair (a; p), where p = (a) and a is the steady-state solution
to the short-run outcome functions, a = h((a)): In this setting, a BDP corresponds to the
steady state of an adjustment dynamics where the DM is myopic (i.e., does not anticipate
that the psychological state at t+1 is a¤ected by the action chosen at t) and, thus, long-run
behavior corresponds to the outcome of a BDP.4
In contrast, in an SDP, the DM is assumed to be farsighted. The DM anticipates that
p adjusts to a according to (:) and taking this into account, chooses a. Formally, the
outcome of an SDP is the steady state solution a satisfying a 2 a 2 A : a (a) a0, a0 2 A	
and p = (a). Note that, in this simple framework, the DM solving an SDP instantaneously
adjusts to the steady-state outcome. Therefore, the initial psychological state, p0, has no
impact on the steady state solution with farsightedness.5
Predicting short-run but not long-run psychological states
So far we have assumed that agents fail to anticipate the consequences of their choices
on their future psychological states, including those psychological states that are a¤ected
in the immediate future. Arguably, there are situations in which DMs do understand and
anticipate the near-term consequences of their actions (e.g., getting a nicotine rush from
4See also Von Weizsacker (1971), Hammond (1976), Pollak (1978) who make a similar point for the case
of adaptive preferences dened over consumption.
5Non-trivial dynamics would be associated with farsighted behavior if underlying preferences or action
sets were time variant.
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smoking a cigarette) but fail to predict the more delayed consequences (e.g. developing
nicotine dependency or lung cancer from smoking).6 We account for these situations as
follows. Let h2(p) = h ((h(p))) and dene ht (p) = h
 
(ht 1(p))

iteratively t = 1; 2; :::.
Fix a p0 2 P and some nite T  1. Dene a sequence of short-run outcomes compatible
with T -period forecasting as the relations at 2 hT (pt 1) and pt = (at), t = 1; 2; :::. At each
step, the DM chooses a best-response that anticipates the short-run psychological states
within a T -period horizon. Dene now the long-run outcomes compatible with T -period
forecasting as a pair a0; p0 with p0 = (a0) and a0 being the steady-state solution to the short-
run outcome function i.e. a0 = hT ((a0)). It follows that long-run behavior corresponds to
the outcome of a BDP where the feedback e¤ect is 0(a) = (hT 1(a)).
Partial prediction
There are situations in which DMs make only partial predictions of the changes in
their psychological states. For example, they may be uncertain about the mechanisms
through which high stress can be reduced. To model these situations we assume that the
DM predicts that her psychological state will respond to her chosen action with prob-
ability q, 0  q  1. For convenience, we assume that the binary relation  has an
(expected) utility representation u : A  P ! <. Let v(a) = u(a; (a)), h(p; q) =
fa 2 A : a 2 arg maxa2A qv(a) + (1  q)u(a; p)g and assume that h(p; q) is unique. Fix a
p0 2 P . Again, we use the similar argument from above, and dene a sequence of short-
run: at 2 h(pt 1; q) and pt = (at), t = 1; 2; :::. where at each step, the DM chooses a
myopic best-response. We also dene long-run outcomes as a pair a; p with p = (a) and a
being the steady-state solution to the short-run outcome functions i.e. a = h((a); q). The
long-run behavior corresponds to the outcome of a BDP where the preferences are repre-
sented by a utility function w(a; p) = qv(a) + (1   q)u(a; p). This formulation is formally
equivalent to the modelling of projection bias in Loewenstein et. al. (2003).
Note that the above representation is consistent with incomplete learning: as long as
the decision-maker doesnt fully learn to internalize the feedback e¤ect from actions to
psychological states, there is way of re-labelling variables so that the steady-state preferences
corresponding to an adaptive preference mechanism are the outcomes of a BDP.
6See for example Baron (2008) and Beshears et. al (2008) for evidence on these psychological patterns.
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2.3 Reduced form representation
Various interpretations can be given to p, e.g., psychological state, reference point, expecta-
tions or, more generally, any dimension of the object of choice that the individual, for some
reason, could take as given at the point of making a choice. Are all of these interpretations
consistent with our general theoretical framework?
Our analysis assumes that a DMs well-being depends on both current action and psy-
chological state. In some cases, the action causes the psychological state (e.g., where an
emotion state (e.g., fear, anxiety, stress) or the reference point adjusts quickly to current
actions), but in others (e.g., where the state concerns expectations, endowments or beliefs)
the states precedes the action, and in this sense, our denition of consistent decision state
is an equilibrium concept.7
Consistent with the dynamic interpretation of the general framework, in the denition
of an SDP, internalization (i.e. rationally anticipating the actual e¤ects of ones actions) is
equivalent to the DM anticipating equilibrium (e.g., ones own actions is what one expected
it to be, or what others expected it to be) and behaving accordingly.
It follows that our general framework, by allowing for a feedback e¤ect from actions to
the psychological state and by making the distinction between an SDP and a BDP, uni-
es seemingly disconnected models in the literature, from situations where the psychological
state corresponds to the decision makers status-quo (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), beliefs
(Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1989; Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), emotions (Bracha
and Brown, 2007; Loewenstein, 1996), future tastes (Loewenstein et. al., 2003), (endoge-
nous) reference points (Shalev, 2000; Koszegi, 2005; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006; 2007), aspi-
rations (Dalton et. al. 2010) or adaptive preferences over consumption (already referred to
above).
2.4 Stackelberg vs. Nash in an intra-self game
In a formal sense, we could also interpret the distinction between an SDP and BDP as
corresponding to the Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium of dual self intra-personal game
7A similar notion of equilibrium is used in Koszegui and Rabin (2006) and Geanakoplos, Pearce and
Stacchetti (1989).
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where one self chooses actions a and the other self chooses the psychological state p and
(a) describes the best-response of the latter for each a 2 A.
In a Stackelberg equilibrium, the self choosing actions anticipates that the other self
chooses a psychological state according to the function (:). In a Nash equilibrium, both
selves take the choices of the other self as given when making its own choices. In this
interpretation, it follows that in the welfare analysis reported below, only the preferences
of the self that chooses actions is taken into account.
2.5 Existence
So far we have implicitly assumed that both SDP and BDP are well-dened i.e. lead to
well dened outcomes. In what follows, we check for the existence of solutions to an SDP
and a BDP in situations where the underlying preferences are not necessarily complete or
transitive and underlying action sets are not necessarily convex. Mandler (2005) shows
that incomplete preferences and intransitivity is required for "status quo maintenance"
(encompassing endowment e¤ects, loss aversion and willingness to pay-willingness to accept
diversity) to be outcome rational. Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1991) argue that reference
dependent preferences may not be convex. So we allow preferences to be incomplete, non-
convex and acyclic (and not necessarily transitive) and we show existence of a solution
to a BDP extending Ghosals (2010) result for normal form games to behavioral decision
problems.8
Proposition 1. Suppose the map  : A ! P is increasing. Under assumptions of
single-crossing, quasi-supermodularity and monotone closure,9 a solution to a BDP exists.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The preceding existence result doesnt cover situations with payo¤s as in Example 4.
In such cases, where there are no pure action solutions to a BDP, what are the possible
outcomes?
Given that the outcome of a BDP can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of a two
8The seminal proof for existence of equilibria with incomplete preferences in Shafer and Sonnenschein
(1975) requires convexity both for showing the existence of an optimal choice and using Kakutanis x-point
theorem.
9These terms are all dened in the appendix below.
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person game, as long as A and P are nite, a behavioral decision outcome involving ran-
domization always exists.
A di¤erent possibility, referring back to the dynamic interpretation of model, is that
in such situations, the sequence of short-run outcomes will cycle. Moreover, under the
assumptions required to prove Proposition 1, as shown in the appendix, h(:) is an increasing
map of p so that the sequence of short-run outcomes is a (component-wise) increasing
sequence (as by assumption is contained in a compact set and therefore, converges to its
supremum which is necessarily a BDP). So the existence result covers not only cases where a
solution to a BDP (equivalently, a steady-state solution to the myopic preference adjustment
mechanism) exists, but also ensures that short-run outcomes converge to a BDP.
3 Axiomatic Characterization and Welfare
3.1 Choice data compatible with a BDP and an SDP
Our model is about two distinctive theories of individual behavior: one characterized as a
Standard Decision Problem (SDP) and the other as a Behavioral Decision Problem (BDP).
What is the choice structure that characterizes each of these theories? To answer this
question, we provide an axiomatic characterization of BDP and SDP outcomes on the basis
of choice data alone.10
Fix ,  : A ! P and a family A of non-empty subsets of A. Dene two correspon-
dences, S and B, from A to A as
S(A0) =

a : (a; p)   a0; p0 for all a0 2 A0, p0 = (a0) and p = (a)	
and
B(A0) = fa : (a; p)   a0; p for all a0 2 A0 and p = (a)g;
so, the choices corresponding to a standard and behavioral decision problem, respectively.
Suppose that we observe a correspondence C from A to A such that C(A0)  A0.
We say that SDP (respectively, BDP) rationalizes C if there exist P ,  and  such that
C(A0) = S(A0) (respectively, C(A0) = B(A0)).
10We are grateful to Andres Carvajal for his helpful suggestions on this section of the paper.
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Consider the following condition introduced by Cherno¤ (1954) and Sen (1971) (Sens
Axiom ) (henceforth Cherno¤s axiom):
Cherno¤ s axiom. For all A0; A00  A, if A00  A0 and C(A0) \ A00 is non-empty, then
C(A0) \A00  C(A00):
The choice correspondence is (weakly) increasing as the choice set shrinks when all
alternatives chosen in the larger set are also present in the smaller set.
The following result provides an axiomatic characterization of choice data compatible
with a BDP.
Proposition 2. Choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of a BDP if and only if
Cherno¤ s axiom is satised.
Proof. (i) We show that if choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of a BDP,
then, Cherno¤ s axiom holds.
Fix ,  : A! P . If
a 2 B(A0) = a : (a; p)   a0; p for all a0 2 A0, p = (a)	
and a 2 A00  A0, it follows that
a 2 B(A00) = a : (a; p)   a0; p for all a0 2 A0, p = (a)	 :
Therefore, C(A0) \A00  C(A00) as required.
(ii) We show that if choice data satises Cherno¤ s axiom, it is rationalizable as the
outcome of a BDP.
To this end, we specify  : A! P so that it is one-to-one and onto.
Next we specify preferences : for each non-empty A0  A and a 2 C(A0),  satises
the condition that (a; p)  (a0; p) for all a0 2 A0, p = (a).
Consider C(A0) for some non-empty A0  A. By construction if a 2 C(A0) ) B(A0)
and therefore, C(A0)  B(A0).
We need to check that for the above specication of ,  : A ! P , B(A0)  C(A0).
Suppose to the contrary, there exists a0 2 B(A0) but a0 =2 C(A0). It follows that (a0; p0) 
(b; p0) for all b 2 A0. Since a0 =2 C(A0), by construction this is only possible if a0 2 C(B)
for some B with A0  B. But, then, by Cherno¤ s axiom a0 2 C(A0), a contradiction.
Therefore, B(A0)  C(A0).
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As C(A0)  B(A0), it follows that C(A0) = B(A0) as required. 
Next, consider the following condition introduced by Arrow (1959) (henceforth Arrows
axiom):
Arrows axiom. If A0  A and C(A) \A0 is non-empty, then C(A0) = C(A) \A0:
When the set of feasible alternatives shrinks, the choice from the smaller set consists
precisely of those alternatives chosen in the larger set and remain feasible, if there is any.
The following result provides an axiomatic characterization of choice data compatible
with an SDP.
Proposition 3. Choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of an SDP if and only if
Arrows axiom is satised.
Proof. (i) We show that if choice data is rationalizable as the outcome of an SDP, then,
Arrows axiom holds.
Fix ,  : A! P . If
a 2 S(A0) =
(
a : (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all a0 2 A0, p0 = (a0)
and p = (a)
)
and A00  A0, it follows that
a 2 S(A00) =
(
a : (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all a0 2 A00, p0 = (a0)
and p = (a)
)
:
Therefore, C(A0) \A00  C(A00).
It remains to check that C(A00) = S(A00)  C(A0) \ A00 = S(A0) \ A00. Suppose there
exists a0 2 C(A00) = S(A00) but a0 =2 S(A0) \ A00. Then,a0 2 A0 but a0 =2 S(A0). However,
by construction, both (a0; p0)  (a; p) and (a0; p0)  (a; p) for p0 = (a0) and p = (a).
Therefore, a0 2 S(A0), a contradiction.
It follows that C(A00)  C(A0) \A00 and therefore, C(A00) = C(A0) \A00 as required.
(ii) We show that if choice data satises Arrows axiom, it is rationalizable as the
outcome of an SDP.
To this end, we specify  : A ! P so that it is one-to-one and onto. Next we specify
preferences : for each non-empty A0  A and a 2 C(A0),  satises the condition that
(a; p)  (a0; p0) for all a0 2 A0, p = (a) and p0 = (a0). Consider C(A0) for some non-empty
A0  A. By construction if a 2 C(A0)) S(A0) and therefore, C(A0)  S(A0).
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We need to check that for the above specication of ,  : A ! P , S(A0)  C(A0).
Suppose to the contrary, there exists a0 2 S(A0) but a0 =2 C(A0). It follows that (a0; p0) 
(b; q) for all b 2 A0 and q = (b). Since a0 =2 C(A0), by construction this is only possible
if a0 2 C(A00) for some A00 with A0  A00. But, then, by Arrows axiom a0 2 C(A0) a
contradiction. Therefore, S(A0)  C(A0). As C(A0)  S(A0), it follows that C(A0) = S(A0)
as required. 
Standard choice theory is falsiable if Arrows axiom holds. Proposition 3 shows that
any choice data is compatible with SDP if and only if it is also compatible with the standard
choice theory.11
Next, by example, we show that if C(:) satises Cherno¤ s axiom but not Arrows axiom
it can be rationalized as the outcome of a BDP but not an SDP. Suppose A = fa1; a2; a3g. If
C(A) = fa1g but C(fa1; a2g) = fa1; a2g, then C cannot be rationalized as the outcome of an
SDP. However, C can be rationalized as the outcome of a BDP by setting P = fp1; p2; p3g,
(a1) = p1, (a2) = p2, (a3) = p3, and  such that:
p1 p2 p3
a1 3 1 2
a2 2 2 1
a3 1 3 1
In this case, B (A) = fa1g and B(fa1; a2g) = fa1; a2g.
Observe that if choice data satises the following condition namely that if A0  A and
C(A)\A0 is non-empty, then fC(A) \A0g\C(A0) is the empty set, then such data cannot
be rationalized either as the outcome of a BDP or SDP. When the set of feasible alternatives
shrinks, the choice from the smaller set does not include any alternative selected from the
larger set and remains feasible, if there is any.
Manzini and Mariotti (2009) propose a decision-making procedure in which DMs cat-
egorize alternatives before choosing (CTC). CTC can rationalize pairwise cycles of choice.
For example, suppose A = fa; b; cg and C(A) = fag, C (fa; bg) = fag, C (fb; cg) = fbg but
C (fc; ag) = fcg. CTC can rationalize this choice data but BDP cant as this data is in-
consistent with Cherno¤ s axiom. However, if C (fc; ag) = fc; ag, the resulting choice data
11Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)s axiomatic characterization of rational choice with status quo bias (exoge-
nous to the actions chosen by the decision-maker) satises Arrows axiom among other axioms.
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is consistent with BDP. Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2009), Rubinstein and Salant
(2010) also can rationalize pairwise cycles of choice.
3.2 Choice and welfare
The recent work on welfare analysis of non-rational choice data relies on ordinal (i.e., choice
data) information alone to derive a partial preference ordering based on pairwise coherence
(Bernheim and Rangel, 2009; Rubinstein and Salant, 2008; Green and Hojman, 2008 and
earlier by Sen, 1971). The issue is whether it is possible, solely on choice data alone, to
allow for a divergence between choice and welfare.12 To this end, we examine the divergence
between choice and welfare while relying solely on choice data.
Fix A the set of alternatives. Let eA denote the set of subsets of A consisting of singletons
so that for each a 2 A, fag 2 eA. The choice data we use is generated by the following
choice experiment involving two distinct choice scenarios:
Choice Scenario 1: Rank any two choice sets consisting of pairwise comparisons of
singleton choice sets, i.e. all pairs fag and fa0g in eA.
For example, if a is smoking and a0 is not-smoking, fa0g is a situation in which the
option of smoking is not available, and the only available option is "not smoking" (i.e. go
for dinner to a non-smoking restaurant) and fag is a situation in which the option of "not
smoking" is not available and the only available option is to smoke (i.e. go for dinner to a
restaurant that only admits smokers).
Choice Scenario 2: Rank the two actions in the choice set where both actions used in
the preceding pairwise comparison are already available, i.e. actions in fa; a0g for each such
pair of actions.
For example, choose between smoking and not smoking over dinner in a restaurant where
both choices are already available.
The interpretation is as follows. Across all possible pairwise comparisons of actions
a; a0 2 A, in choice scenario 1, the decision maker is being asked to choose between a
12The result reported in the preceeding subsection suggests that when the observed choice data violates
Cherno¤ but not Arrow, there is at least an argument for further non-choice data (such as psychological
data) to potentially qualify the Pareto approach. For example, Green and Hojman (2008) study divergence
between choice and welfare which relies on use of cardinal information.
19
situation where only action a is available and another one where only action a0 is available.
In choice scenario 2, the DM has to choose between a and a0 when both actions are already
available.
For each pair of actions a; a0 2 A, suppose we observe two non-empty correspondences
~C(fag ; fa0g)  (a; a0) and C(a; a0)  (a; a0). Consider the following two conditions:eC1 . ~C(fag ; fa0g) = C(a; a0), for all a; a0 2 A;eC2 . ~C(fag ; fa0g) \ C(a; a0) is empty for some a; a0 2 A.
Condition eC1 states that in any pairwise comparison of fag ; fa0g 2 eA, the DM prefers
fag to fa0g if and only if the DM chooses a over a0 when both actions are already available.
Condition eC2 states that the DMs choices are reversed when both actions are already
available relative to the DMs choice between singleton sets.
The following proposition claries the relationship between choice and welfare in our
set-up:
Proposition 4. Suppose there is a pair of actions a; a0 such that eC1 is violated and eC2
is satised. Then, the decision-makers observed choice in the pairwise comparison between
a and a0 is welfare dominated.
Proof. In choice scenario 1, the DM, whether behavioral or standard, in any pairwise
comparison fag ; fa0g 2 eA, the DM is being forced to choose between the pair (a;  (a))
and (a0;  (a0)) ; i.e. between consistent decision-states. Therefore, for any pair of actions
a; a0 2 A, ~C(fag ; fa0g) = S(a; a0). It follows that if the DM solves an SDP, observed choice
must satisfy condition eC1 .
On the other hand, if the DM is behavioral, eC1 could be violated. We show this by
example. Let A = fa1; a2g, P = fp1; p2g, (a1) = p1 and  (a2) = p2 and  is such that
p1 p2
a1 1  1
a2 2 0
Clearly S(A) = ~C(fa1g ; fa2g) = C(a1; a2) = a1 but B(A) = a2.
Now, suppose eC2 is satised for some pair of actions a; a0 2 A. Without loss of general-
ity, suppose ~C(fag ; fa0g) = S(a; a0) = a but ~C(fag ; fa0g) \ C(a; a0) is empty. Then, there
exists P and  : A! P such that (a;  (a))  (a0;  (a0)) but both (a0;  (a))  (a;  (a)) and
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(a0;  (a0))  (a;  (a0)) so that B(a; a0) = C(a; a0) = a0. Therefore, the decision maker can
do strictly better by choosing a di¤erent action a when both actions are already available.
Note that the preference relation derived by pairwise coherence as in Bernheim and
Rangel (2009) would rank a0 over a. However, we conclude that the individual is better o¤
at a than at a0 even though the individual always chooses a0 when both a and a0 are already
available.
Continuing with the example of smoking, a behavioral smoker will prefer fa0g to fag but
will smoke when both a; a0 are already available thus revealing a preference for not having
the alternative to smoke. A standard smoker (one who chooses to smoke after internalizing
the feedback e¤ect) will never choose situation fa0g in which "smoking" is not a possibility.
4 Indistinguishability
How relevant is the distinction between a BDP and an SDP? In this section, we derive the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which BDP and SDP outcomes are indistinguish-
able from one another and show, in smooth settings, that the two decision problems are,
generically, distinguishable.
A BDP is indistinguishable from an SDP if and only if B = S. Note that indistin-
guishability is, from a normative viewpoint, a compelling property. What matters for
welfare purposes is the ranking of consistent decision states, which is the preference relation
that a standard decision maker will use to make a decision. When B = S, the outcomes
(consistent decision states) of an SDP coincide with that of a BDP, and therefore whether
or not the decision maker internalizes the feedback e¤ect has no normative implications at
all.
If  (a) =  (a0) for all a; a0 2 A, a BDP is, by construction, indistinguishable from an
SDP13. So suppose (a) 6= (a0) for some pair of distinct actions a; a0.
Consider the following conditions:
C^ 1 : For (a; p), (a0; p0) 2 
 if (a; p)  (a0; p), then (a; p)  (a0; p0);
C^ 2 : For (a; p), (a0; p0) 2 
 such that (a; p)  (a0; p0), (a; p)  (a0; p).
13 In this case, p is exogenous to individual choice and therefore, both, standard and behavioral decision
makers rank actions in the same way.
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Fix the consistent states (a; p), (a0; p0). Condition (C^1) states that if the action a
weakly dominates the action a0 at the psychological state p, then the pair (a; p) also weakly
dominates the pair (a0; p0). Condition (C^2) states that if the pair (a; p) weakly dominates
the pair (a0; p0), then the action a weakly dominates the action a0 at the psychological state
p.
Clearly under (C^1), B  S and if B  S that (C^1) has to hold is also immediate (from
negating (C^1) and the denition of B and S). Similarly, under (C^2), S  B and if S  B
(C^1) has to hold is also immediate (from negating (C^2) and the denition of B and S). It
follows that (C^1) and (C^2) are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for indistinguishability:
Lemma 1. Suppose that both B and S are non-empty. Then, (i) B  S if and only if
(C^1) holds. (ii) S  B if and only if (C^2) holds.
Note that preferences in Example 1 violate (C^1) but satisfy (C^2) while the preferences
in Example 2 violate both (C^1) and (C^2). Shalev (2000) shows (in Theorem 1 of his paper)
that in the static case his loss averse preferences satisfy both (C^1) and (C^2). Geanakoplos,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) construct examples where, with one active player, both (C^1)
and (C^2) are violated.
To further understand the conditions under which indistinguishability occurs, it is con-
venient to look at smooth decision problems where decision outcomes are characterized by
rst-order conditions. We show that for the case of smooth decision problems, behavioral
decisions are generically distinguishable from standard decisions.
A decision problem is smooth if (a) both A and P are convex, open sets in <k and
<n respectively, (b) preferences over A  P are represented by a smooth, concave utility
function u : A P ! < and (c) the feedback map  : A! P is also smooth and concave.
A set of decision problems that satises the smoothness assumptions is diverse if and
only if for each (a; p) 2 A  P it contains the decision problem with utility function and
feedback e¤ect dened, in the neighborhood of (a; p), by
u+ p
and
   (a0   a)
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for each a0 in a neighborhood of a and for parameters (; ) in a neighborhood of 0.
A property holds generically if and only if it holds for a set of decision problems of full
Lebesgue measure within the set of diverse smooth decision problems.
Proposition 5: For a diverse set of smooth decision problems, a standard decision
problem is generically distinguishable from a behavioral decision problem.
Proof: Let v(a) = u(a; (a)).
The outcome (a^; p^) of an SDP satises the rst-order condition
@av(a^) = @au(a^; (a^)) + @pu(a^; (a^))@a(a^) = 0 (1)
while the outcome (a; p) of a BDP satises the rst-order condition
@au(a
; p) = 0; p = (a): (2)
For (a; p) = (a^; p^), it must be the case that
@pu(a
; p)@a(a) = 0: (3)
It is easily checked that requiring both (C^1) and (C^2) to hold is equivalent to requiring
that the preceding equation also holds.
Consider a decision problem with (a; p) = (a^; p^). Perturbations of the utility function
and the feedback e¤ect do not a¤ect (2) and hence (a; p) but they do a¤ect (3) and via
(1) a¤ect (a^; p^). Therefore, (a; p) 6= (a^; p^) generically. 
Eq. (3) shows in a simple quick way that BDP and SDP are indistinguishable only in
isolated cases (e.g., when (a) or u(a; p) are just constants).14
Remarks on Distinguishability and Welfare:
14Note that if payo¤s over actions have a value function component á la Kahneman and Tversky (where the
psychological state is a reference point), the decision problem isnt necessarily smooth or even concave. We
note that the rst-order approach adopted in Proposition 5 can be extended to non-smooth decision problems
as long preferences are concave overall (even though an individual component such as a value function may
be non-concave). This would cover cases where u(a; p) = f(a) + g(a  p) where g(:) is a Kahneman-Tversky
value function with loss aversion and u(a; p) is concave in a for any xed p and v(a) = f(a) + g(a   (a))
is concave in a. This would be the case when f(a) is concave and g(:) is piece-wise linear with a kink at
zero. Essentially, we will need to work with the subgradient of v(:) and u(:) and note that at an action a is
an interior optimum of v(:) if and only if it is contained in the subgradient of v(a) and for each xed p, an
action a; p is an interior optimum of u(a; p) if and only if it is contained in the subgradient (with respect to
a) of u(a; p) (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemarechal (2001)).
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1. In a distinguishable decision problem, the outcomes of an SDP provide the relevant
normative benchmark. For example, in the three period decision-problem with the dynamic
inconsistency we studied in Section 2, the relevant benchmark was the preferences of the
DM at t = 0. Moreover, in a distinguishable decision problem, the outcomes of a BDP have
properties very similar to those of two person normal form games.
2. Given the above results on distinguishability, whenever a choice correspondence
satises Cherno¤s axiom (Proposition 2), there would seem to imply a strong case for
paternalistic interventions. However, the caveat to note is that the potential for welfare
improvement by adopting paternalistic interventions will be limited by the information a
social planner has.
3. The framework of decision making studied here takes the position that psychological
states are normatively relevant. In contrast, in an inuential contribution, Bernheim and
Rangel (2009) adopt the normative position that what matters for welfare is a binary relation
constructed solely on actions. The issue is whether the ranking over actions using the binary
relation in BR constructed solely on the basis of observed choices coincides with the xed
underlying preference relation % over the set of consistent decision states. Observe that
the ranking of the preference relation  over the set of consistent decision states directly
induces a unique ranking of actions (a; (a))  (a0; (a0)). Does this make sense as a BR
ranking? Clearly, one necessary condition for this to make sense is that there are no a and
a0 such that (i) (a; (a))  (a0; (a0)) and (ii) for all p, (a0; p)  (a; p) (as in this case for
BR a0 is preferred a). Notice that the conjunction of (i) and (ii) is ruled out whenever the
decision problems are indistinguishable. As already pointed out, Example 2 shows how this
condition may fail.15
15Dalton and Ghosal (2010) distinguish between a pre-decision and a post-decision frame and, using this
distinction, examine the relation between the normative implications of decision problems with endogeneous
frames to choice with frames and ancillary conditions studied by Bernheim and Rangel (2009) and Rubinstein
and Salant (2008).
24
5 Policy Discussion
Although the aim of this paper is not to provide policy recommendations, we devote this
last section to mention some novel policy implications for behavioral economics which are
directly implied by our framework.
One policy recommendation that has attracted attention in the last years is what Thaler
and Sustein (2003) called libertarian paternalism. It is argued that, in the cases in which
the choice is reference-dependent (e.g., status quo bias or default option bias), the social
planner should choose the reference point or default option in order to steer peoples choices
in desirable directions. In this way, the social planner would achieve her goal of maximizing
peoples welfare without forcing anybody to do anything they wouldnt normally do.
To what extent are Thaler and Susteins (2003) conclusions a¤ected when reference
points adjust quickly to actions? The answer to this question depends on the number of
solutions of a BDP. If there are multiple welfare ranked BDP outcomes, as in Example 3
(status-quo), then the interventions that determine an initial reference point might have an
impact by selecting which steady-state preferences the decision-maker converges to.
However, if there is a unique BDP outcome or no pure action to a BDP, then the initial
policy-determined reference point will not have an impact on the steady state preferences
to which the decision-maker with adaptive preferences converges to. In such cases, any
intervention that increases the probability with which the DM internalizes the (sometimes
unconscious) mechanism guiding her behavior and a¤ecting her welfare will be individual
welfare improving. An example of such intervention is psychotherapy, which has been
shown to be an e¤ective device in helping people to learn how to cope with stress, anger,
fear, anxiety or low motivation (Lazarus, 1984; Hawton et. al, 1989). The case for such
intervention is stronger in cases in which the planner has incomplete information about
individualspreferences.
To illustrate our point, consider Example 2 (addiction) where there is a unique outcome
of a BDP which is di¤erent from the unique outcome of the SDP. In this example, if
the individual doesnt take the feedback e¤ect from actions to psychological states into
account, she always chooses to drink alcohol; however, the reverse would be true, if she
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took the feedback e¤ect (that being inebriated goes with drinking alcohol) into account.
Let , 0    1, denote the probability with which the individual does take the feedback
e¤ect into account. Then, given the psychological state of sober, the payo¤ from choosing
to drink is ( 1) + (1   )( 1) =  1 while the payo¤ from choosing not to drink is
:0 + (1   )( 2) =  2(1   ). Clearly, if  > 12 , the individual will not be tempted to
drink in the rst place. To complete the computation note that given the psychological
state inebriated, the payo¤ from choosing to drink is ( 1) + (1   ) = 1   2 while the
payo¤ from choosing not to drink is :0 + (1   ) = 1    so that again if  > 12 , the
individual will not choose to drink.
In Example 4, there is no pure action outcome to the BDP. If the individual takes the
feedback e¤ect into account with probability . Given the psychological state of "tempted",
the payo¤ from investing in the liquid asset is (1) + (1  )(1) = 1 while the payo¤ from
investing in the illiquid asset is :R+(1 )(R) = R. Since R > 1; the individual will always
choose to invest in the illiquid asset when she is tempted. Now, given the psychological
state of "not tempted", the payo¤ from investing in the liquid asset is (1) + (1  )R0 =
R0 (R0 1) while the payo¤ from investing in the illiquid asset is R. Again, if  > R0 RR0 1 ,
the individual will invest in the liquid asset.
6 Related Literature
There is emerging literature in economics aiming to understand how welfare analysis should
be performed in the presence of non-standard decision makers.16 This literature can be
divided into two di¤erent approaches. One approach maintains choices as a foundation for
normative analysis (Bernheim and Rangel, 2009 and Rubinstein and Salant, 2008) and an-
other approach rejects choice altogether as a foundation for normative analysis and proposes
alternative measures of individual welfare based on an individuals happiness (Kahneman
et. al., 1997), opportunities (Sugden, 2004) or capabilities (Sen, 1985).
Our paper is somehow orthogonal to these two approaches. In our framework, choices
are valid for welfare analysis, not because they may reveal normative preferences, but more
16See Bernheim (2009) for a discussion of this literature.
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importantly because they allow us to distinguish typically suboptimal behavior from rational
behavior.
There is also emerging literature that provides axiomatic characterizations of decision-
making models with some particular behavioral avour. Manzini and Mariotti (2009), for
example, assume that DMs categorize alternatives before choosing (CTC). They show that
choice data is rationalizable by CTC only if it is rationalizable by the Rational Shortlist
Method (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007). They also show that choice data is rationalizable by
CTC if and only if it can also be rationalized in the sense of Cherepanov, Feddersen and
Sandroni (2008). Unlike these models, which can rationalize pairwise cycles of choice, BDP
cannot, as it is inconsistent with Cherfno¤s condition. Therefore, there are choice data
that cant be rationalized as the outcome of a BDP but can be rationalized as the outcome
of a Rational Shortlist Method and also rationalized in the sense of Cherepanov, Feddersen
and Sandroni (2008).
We should mention Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), whose work is also related to our paper,
as they characterize a decision-making model that allows for the presence of a status quo
bias. Like us (as well as Manzini and Mariotti, 2007; 2009), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)
adopt the revealed preference approach and incorporate the standard choice theory as a
special case. A major di¤erence between their paper and the present work, however, is that
we allow problems with endogenous status quo as well in our domain of choice problems.
Our paper is also related to recent literature that aims at eliciting welfare preferences
of non-standard DMs. Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2009), for example, show how
preferences corresponding to a decision maker with limited attention can be identied.
Rubinstein and Salant (2010) elicit the individuals welfare preferences when the decision
maker reacts to di¤erent payo¤-irrelevant circumstances. Unlike these papers, our focus
here is not on the identication of normative preferences of the behavioral decision maker
but on the identication of the choice structure consistent with her behavior. In that
sense, our paper is more closely related to a recent paper by Manzini and Mariotti (2010),
who model mood-dependent choice and characterize their structure in terms of consistency
requirements of the observed choice data. Unlike us, their framework is silent about the
fact that choices also may a¤ect mood.
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We should also mention the work of Koszegi (2010) and Koszegi and Rabin (2006) that
models endogenous reference-dependent preferences. While they focus on the positive im-
plications of their model, we focus on the normative implications. Moreover, we contribute
to this literature by providing testable restrictions against which actual choice data can in
principle be compared.
Finally, our framework has some shared features with the concept of projection bias
introduced by Loewenstein et. al. (2003). People with projection bias tend to exaggerate
the degree to which their future tastes will resemble their current state. Projection bias
provides a possible explanation of why DMs may solve a BDP instead of an SDP in some
particular situations. For example, projection bias can explain why behavioral DMs get
trapped in addiction or overconsumption of durable goods. However, projection bias cannot
account for all the models encompassed in BDPs. This is the case, for instance, for models
of cognitive dissonance or aspirations.
7 Concluding Remarks
Unlike much existing work that focuses on a specic behavioral procedure of choice, our
paper provides an axiomatic characterization of the choice theoretical structure of a large
set of seemingly disconnected behavioral procedures. We showed that if observed behavior is
consistent with Cherno¤ s axiom, it is consistent with a DM who doesnt fully internalize all
the consequences of her actions. We showed that, typically, when this condition is satised,
individual behavior is distinguishable i.e., sub-optimal. In addition, we have proposed a
choice experiment that allows inferring the divergence between choice and welfare on the
basis of choice data alone.
This paper opens some interesting avenues for further research.
First, since our model is fully characterized in terms of a simple condition on observable
choices, this permits direct, simple and nonparametric tests of the model. It is possible
to design a choice experiment to test whether the observed behavior satises the axioms
characterizing behavioral and standard decisions in contrast to the axioms characterizing
other decision making procedures. Such an experiment should be able to elicit the entire
28
choice functions from each subject, over the domain of all subsets of a grand set of all
alternatives.
A second route that one can take is to extend our framework to an N-person strategic
context in which playerspayo¤s are not only a¤ected by individual actions and endogenous
psychological states but also by others actions and endogenous psychological states. For
example, one can dene empathy as the capacity to forecast other players internal decision
process. A player who has the capacity to empathize should be able to predict and under-
stand othersactions and intentions, with important positive and normative implications.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Existence Result
Recall that the preferences of the DM is denoted by  a binary relation ranking pairs
of decision states in (A P )  (A P ). As the focus is on incomplete preferences, in
this section, instead of working with , we nd it convenient to specify two other prefer-
ence relations,  and . The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2 is written as (a; p)  (a0; p0)
and is to be read as "(a; p) is strictly preferred to (a0; p0) by the DM". The expression
f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2 is written as (a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read as "(a; p) is indi¤erent to
(a0; p0) by the DM". Dene
(a; p)  (a0; p0), either (a; p)  (a0; p0) or (a; p)  (a0; p0):
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Once  is dened in this way, the results obtained in the preceding sections continue to
apply. In what follows, we do not require either  or  or  to be transitive
Schoeld (1984) shows that if action sets are convex or are smooth manifolds with a
special topological property, the (global) convexity assumption made by Shafer and Sonnen-
schein (1975) can be replaced by a "local" convexity restriction, which, in turn, is equivalent
to a local version of acyclicity (and which guarantees the existence of a maximal element).
However, here, as action sets are not necessarily convex and are allowed to be a collection
of discrete points, Schoelds equivalence does not apply.
Suppose  is
(i) acyclic i.e. there is no nite set

(a1; p1); :::; (aT ; pT )
	
such that (at 1; pt 1)  (at; pt),
t = 2; :::; T , and (aT ; pT )  (a1; p1), and
(ii)  1 (a; p) = f(a0; p0) 2 A P : (a; p)  (a0; p0)g is open relative to A P i.e.  has
an open lower section17.
Suppose both A and P are compact. Then, by Bergstrom (1975), it follows that S is
non-empty.
Dene
a p a0 , (a; p)  (a0; p):
The preference relation pis a map, : P ! A  A. If  is acyclic, then for p 2 P , pis
also acyclic. If  has an open lower section, then  1p (a) = fa0 2 A : a  a0g is also open
relative to A i.e. p has an open lower section. In what follows, we write a0 =2p (a) as
a p a0 and a0 2p (a) as a0 p a.
Dene a map 	 : P ! A, where 	(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = ?g: for each p 2 P , 	(p) is
the set of maximal elements of the preference relation p.
We make the following additional assumptions:
(A1) A is a compact lattice;
17The continuity assumption, that  has an open lower section, is weaker than the continuity assumption
made by Debreu (1959) (who requires that preferences have both open upper and lower sections), which in
turn is weaker than the assumption by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) (who assume that preferences have
open graphs). Note that assuming  has an open lower section is consistent with  being a lexicographic
preference ordering over A P .
34
(A2) For each p, and a; a0, (i) if inf(a; a0) p a, then a0 p sup(a; a0) and (ii) if
sup (a; a0) p a then a0 p inf (a; a0) (quasi-supermodularity);
(A3) For each a  a0 and p  p0, (i) if a0 p0 a then a0 p a and (ii) if a p a0 then
a p0 a0 (single-crossing property)18
(A4) For each p and a  a0, (i) if p (a0) = ? and a0 p a, then p (a) = ? and (ii) if
p (a) = ? and a p a0, p (a0) = ? (monotone closure).
Assumptions (A2)-(A3) are quasi-supermodularity and single-crossing property dened
by Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
Assumption (A4) is new. Consider a pair of actions such that the rst action is greater
(in the usual vector ordering) than the second action. For a xed p, suppose the two actions
are unranked by p. Then, assumption (A4) requires that either both actions are maximal
elements for por neither is.
The role played by assumption (A4) in obtaining the monotone comparative statics with
incomplete preferences is claried by the following examples. There preferences and action
sets in each example satisfy assumptions (A1)-(A3). However, assumption (A4) fails to hold
in either example.
Example 1: (	(p) neednt be a lattice.)
P is single valued and A is the four point lattice in <2
f(e; e) ; (f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f)g
where f > e. Suppose that (f; f)  (e; e) but no other pair is ranked. Then, 	 consists
of f(f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f)g clearly not a lattice. Note that in this case, preferences satisfy
acyclicity and quasi-supermodularity (and trivially, single-crossing property). However,
preferences do not satisfy monotone closure: (f; e)  (e; e), with  ((f; e)) = ; and (e; e) 
(f; e), but  ((e; e)) 6= ;.
The preceding example demonstrates that without the additional assumption of monotone
closure, quasi-supermodularity on its own cannot ensure that the set of maximal elements
of  is a sublattice of A even when  is acyclic. The example also demonstrates that 
18For any two vectors x; y 2 <K , the ussual component-wise vector ordering is dened as follows: x  y
if and only if xi  yi for each i = 1; ::;K, and x > y if and only if both x  y and x 6= y, and x y if and
only if xi > yi for each i = 1; ::;K.
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can be acyclic without necessarily satisfying monotone closure and therefore, the two are
distinct conditions on preferences.
Example 2: (No increasing selection from 	(:):)
P = fp; p0g, p < p0, and A is the ve point lattice in <2
f(e; e) ; (f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f) ; (g; g)g
where g > f > e. Preferences are such that: (i) (g; g) p (f; f) p (e; e), , (f; e) p (e; f),
(f; e) p (g; g), (e; f) p (g; g) but the pairs f(f; e) ; (e; e)g, f(e; f) ; (e; e)g, f(f; e) ; (f; f)g
and f(e; f) ; (f; f)g arent ranked by p; (ii) (g; g) p0 (f; f) p0 (e; e), (e; f) p0 (f; e),
(f; e) p0 (g; g), (e; f) p0 (g; g) but the pairs f(f; e) ; (e; e)g, f(e; f) ; (e; e)g, f(f; e) ; (f; f)g
and f(e; f) ; (f; f)g arent ranked by p0 . Note that in this case, both p and p0 satisfy
acyclicity (but not transitivity), quasi-supermodularity and the single-crossing property. It
follows that 	(p) = f(f; e)g and 	(p0) = f(e; f)g (i.e. for both p and p0 the set of maximal
elements is a singleton and hence, trivially a lattice). Therefore, 	(:) does not admit an
increasing selection. Observe that neither p nor p0satisfy monotone closure: (f; f) 
(f; e), with p ((f; e)) = ; and (f; f) p (f; e), but p ((f; f)) 6= ; and (f; f)  (e; f), with
p0 ((e; f)) = ; and (f; f) p0 (e; f), but p0 ((f; f)) 6= ;.
The preceding example demonstrates that with incomplete but acyclic preferences,
quasi-supermodularity and single crossing on their own cannot ensure an increasing se-
lection from the set of maximal elements.
The following result shows that assumptions (A1)-(A4), taken together, are su¢ cient to
ensure monotone comparative statics with incomplete preferences:
Lemma : Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), each p 2 P , 	(p) is non-empty and a compact
sublattice of A where both the maximal and minimal elements, denoted by a(p) and a(p)
respectively, are increasing functions on P .
Proof. By assumption, for each p, p is acyclic,  1p (a) are open relative to A and
A is compact. By Bergstrom (1975), it follows that 	(p) is non-empty. As Bergstrom
(1975) doesnt contain an explicit proof that 	(p) is compact, a proof of this claim follows
next. To this end, note that the complement of the set 	(p) in A is the set 	c(p) =
fa0 2 A :p (a0) 6= ;g. If 	c(p) = ;, then 	(p) = A is necessarily compact. So suppose
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	c(p) 6= ;. For each a0 2 	c(p), there is a00 2 A such that a00 p a0. By assumption,
 1p (a00) is open relative to A. By denition of 	(p),  1p (a00)  	c(p). Therefore,
 1p (a00) is a non-empty neighborhood of a0 2 	c(p) and it is clear that 	c(p) is open
and therefore, 	(p) is closed. As A is compact, 	(p) is also compact. Next, it is shown
that for p  p0 if a 2 	(p) and a0 2 	(p0), then sup (a; a0) 2 	(p) and inf (a; a0) 2 	(p0).
Note that as a0 2 	(p0), a0 p0 inf (a; a0). By quasi-supermodularity, sup (a; a0) p0 a.
By single-crossing, sup (a; a0) p a. As a 2 	(p), p (a) = ;, and by monotone closure
sup (a; a0) p a and p (sup (a; a0)) = ;, it follows that sup (a; a0) 2 	(p). Next, note
that as a 2 	(p), a p sup (a; a0). By single-crossing, a p0 sup (a; a0) and by quasi-
supermodularity, inf (a; a0) p0 a0. As a0 2 	(p0), p0 (a0) = ;, and by monotone closure
inf (a; a0) p0 a0 and p0 (inf (a; a0)) = ;, it follows that inf (a; a0) 2 	(p0). Therefore, (i)
	(p) is ordered, (ii) 	(p) is a compact sublattice of A and has a maximal and minimal
element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by a(p) and a(p), and (iii)
both a(p) and a(p) are increasing functions from P to A.
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, dene a map 	 : A  P ! A  P , 	(a; p) =
(	1(p);	2(a)) as follows: for each (a; p), 	1(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = g and 	2(a) =  (a).
By Theorem 2, 	1(p) is non-empty and compact and for p  p0 if a 2 	1(p) and a0 2 	1(p0),
then sup (a; a0) 2 	1(p) and inf (a; a0) 2 	1(p0). It follows that 	1(p) is ordered and hence
a compact (and consequently, complete) sublattice of A and has a maximal and minimal
element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by a(p) and a(p) respectively.
By assumption 1, it also follows that for each a,  (a) has a maximal and minimal element (in
the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by (a) and (a) respectively. Therefore,
the map (a(p); (a)) is an increasing function from A  P to itself and as A  P is a
compact (and hence, complete) lattice, by applying Tarskis x-point theorem, it follows
that (a; p) = (a(p); (a)) is a x-point of 	 and by a symmetric argument, (a(p); (a)) is
an increasing function from A  P to itself and  a; p =  a(p); (a) is also a x-point of
	; moreover, (a; p) and
 
a; p

are respectively the largest and smallest x-points of 	.
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